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ABSTRACT 
Disentangling the Effects of Political Fragmentation on Voter Turnout:  
the Flemish Municipal Elections  
by Benny Geys and Bruno Heyndels * 
Political fragmentation has been shown to be an important determinant of 
electoral turnout. We introduce an empirical approach that allows disentangling 
the impact of two dimensions of such fragmentation: the number of parties and 
the size inequalities between those parties. This is important as it allows us to 
assess the size, significance and direction of the individual effects of each 
element – an aspect disregarded in previous research. Our empirical analysis of 
the 2000 Flemish municipal elections shows that a higher number of parties 
competing in the election lowers turnout. The size-inequalities between the 
parties exert a positive – though insignificant – influence on voter participation. 
 
Keywords: Voter turnout, political fragmentation, local elections 
JEL Classification: D72, H70 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Auswirkungen politischer Zersplitterung auf die Wahlbeteiligung:  
die flämischen Kommunalwahlen  
Es hat sich gezeigt, dass politische Zersplitterung ein wichtiger Faktor für die 
Wahlbeteiligung ist. Wir stellen einen empirischen Ansatz vor, der den Einfluss 
von zwei unterschiedlichen Dimensionen der Zersplitterung herausarbeitet, 
nämlich die Anzahl der Parteien und die Größenunterschiede zwischen diesen 
Parteien. Dies ermöglicht, Größe, Bedeutung und Richtung der individuellen 
Einflüsse eines jeden Elements zu beurteilen, was in der Forschung bisher ver-
nachlässigt worden ist. Unsere empirische Analyse der flämischen Kommunal-
wahlen im Jahr 2000 zeigt: je mehr Parteien zur Wahl antreten, desto geringer 
ist die Wahlbeteiligung. Die Größenunterschiede zwischen den Parteien haben 
einen positiven, wenn auch nicht signifikanten Einfluss auf die Wahlbeteiligung. 
                                                 
*  We thank John Ashworth, Matthias Benz, An Buysschaert, Bruno De Borger, Kris Deschouwer, Marc 
Hooghe, Wim Moesen, Per Tovmo, Ilse Verschueren, Kristien Werck and participants to the Annual 
Meetings of the European Public Choice Society in Belgirate (Italy) and the Midwest Political Science 
Association in Chicago (US) for their comments on previous versions of this paper.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Political systems based on proportional representation (PR) typically lead to a fragmented 
political landscape with higher numbers of parties in the election compared to plurality and 
majoritarian two-round systems (Duverger, 1972; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989 and Lijphart, 
1994).  Such party system fragmentation has been shown to affect voter participation in the 
political process.  More precisely, two distinct dimensions of political fragmentation have 
been identified as potential determinants of electoral turnout: (a) the number of parties that 
participate in the elections and (b) the size inequalities between those parties.  Still, in 
empirical work it has been common practice to either disregard one of the dimensions 
(looking only at the number of parties) or to treat both dimensions simultaneously in one 
index.  Separation of the effects of both these dimensions is important for both statistical and 
empirical reasons.  Statistically, ignoring one of both dimensions may lead to misspecification 
of the model if both dimensions matter and, consequently, to biased estimation results.  
Empirically, disentangling the effects is the only way to assess whether and to what extent 
each of the dimensions is relevant.  This allows for a direct test of alternative hypotheses that 
have been introduced in the literature on electoral turnout and that have, as yet, remained 
untested.  The central aim of the present paper therefore is to introduce an empirical approach 
that allows separating the effects of both dimensions of political fragmentation.  
Disentangling the fragmentation index into its constituent parts is indispensable to do so. 
 
Our empirical work explains electoral turnout at the 2000 Flemish municipal elections.  
Despite the formal existence of mandatory voting, turnout rates vary considerably between 
municipalities allowing for an empirical analysis aimed at identifying the determinants of 
turnout (De Winter et al., 1991; Ackaert et al., 1992) and, more specifically, to investigate the 
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role of political fragmentation.  Assessing the effects of political fragmentation on turnout in a 
context of PR implies that we analyse the impact of a major characteristic of politics in many 
democratic countries that has until now received scant attention.  Indeed, the turnout literature 
has focused strongly on plurality systems, which are essentially two-party systems.  Actually, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is only one study that investigates the effect of 
fragmentation on turnout explicitly in a context of PR (Hansen, 1994).  Still, as Hansen 
(1994) analyses turnout at Norwegian municipal elections, our own analysis is the first we 
know of that analyses fragmentation in a PR parliamentary context where the executive board 
is formed by a political majority, rather than being proportionate to the seats in the council (as 
in Norway).   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In section 1 we provide the general theoretical framework 
for the analysis of electoral turnout. Section 2 surveys the literature on the relation between 
turnout and political fragmentation.  The empirical analysis is discussed in section 3.  The 
main findings indicate that the effects of both constituent elements of fragmentation – the 
number of parties and the size-inequalities – run in opposite direction.  Turnout falls with the 
number of parties but rises the more unequal in size the political parties are.  The latter effect, 
however, only approaches statistical significance at the 10% level.  Finally, section 4 presents 
a summary of the main conclusions. 
 
 
1. General framework: voting in a multi-party context  
 
Almost 50 years ago, Downs (1957) laid out the groundwork for the expected utility model of 
voter turnout.  This model argues that the individual voter is an homo oeconomicus, a rational 
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man or woman who assesses the relative size of the costs and benefits of his/her possible 
actions.  In deciding whether to vote or abstain, each voter calculates the expected utility from 
each possible action and votes only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  Downs’ 
(1957) model is – like later extensions to it – exclusively aimed at two candidate plurality 
elections.  Hence, it does not take into account the effects from coalition formations that 
frequently arise in non-plurality multi-candidate elections.  Extending the model to include 
such elections, it can be shown that a given individual will vote only if the net benefits of 
voting are strictly positive, i.e. if: 
 
R = – C + D > 0 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−∑−
=
1
1
))((
N
i
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 R  :  Net satisfaction, in utiles, an individual receives from voting 
 N :  Number of possible outcomes (winning parties/coalitions)  
   : Probability that party/coalition i wins if you vote Vip
   : Probability that party/coalition i wins if you abstain Aip
 Ui :  Utility from the victory of party/coalition i 
 C : Costs of voting 
 D  :  Expressive Benefits of voting 
 
The net benefit from voting (R) equals the sum of N-1 “instrumental” benefit terms, minus the 
costs of voting, plus the “expressive” or “consumption” benefits of voting (see also 
McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972).  Let us now take a closer look at each of these three 
elements.   
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 The “instrumental” benefits for each individual voter depend on the future public policy 
that (s)he expects.  This policy is assumed to depend solely on the party or coalition that 
wins the election.  “Winning the election” here means that the party or coalition comes 
into power.  Depending on the electoral context, “winning” may mean that the party 
obtains most votes or that it is successful in the coalition formation process.  Formally, the 
formation of a political majority (government) may be seen as a two-stage process.  First 
seats are allocated by voters and afterwards – in the second stage – a political majority 
forms as the outcome of coalition negotiations.  The second stage of this process may be 
“empty” if voters in the first stage provide a single party with a fraction of the votes 
sufficiently large to secure a parliamentary majority.1   As can be clearly seen in 
expression (1), the instrumental benefit term is the product of two components.  The first 
factor gives the probability that one’s vote is decisive, meaning that it leads 
party/coalition i to victory.  This probability of being decisive is given by the difference 
between the probability that party/coalition i wins if one votes ( ) and the same 
probability when one abstains ( ).  Implicit in this modelling is that voters may have an 
(indirect) influence on the coalition formation process.  This will be the case if the votes 
(seats) obtained by a party determine its power in the coalition negotiations.  The need to 
form a coalition to obtain a majority likely weakens the voter’s influence on the eventual 
outcome.  The reason is that given distributions of seats (power) among parties may allow 
multiple possible coalitions.  As such, the second stage in the process of forming a 
political majority may be a black box to the voter, introducing uncertainty and lowering 
his influence on the outcome.  The second factor in the instrumental benefit term in 
expression (1), (U
V
ip
A
ip
i – UN), gives the difference between the utility gained from 
party/coalition i and the party/coalition which is used as a reference point in the analysis, 
viz. party/coalition N.  The larger this difference, the higher are the potential gains from 
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casting a vote to the voter.  Hence, the “instrumental” benefit for the voter in a multi-
candidate context  “therefore is a series of terms in which each term represents a paired 
comparison” between party/coalition N and any other party/coalition (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook, 1972, 52). 
 
 The costs of voting (C) comprise two different elements.  Firstly, there are the costs one 
incurs by getting informed about the candidates and parties in the election.  These are 
borne before Election Day and are relatively minor in size.  Indeed, it is often argued that 
a lot of information is accessed without real effort by the potential voter through news 
broadcasts and/or overhearing discussions in public areas (Downs, 1957; Aldrich, 1993).  
Secondly, the voter suffers opportunity costs during the act of voting.  The argument here 
is that while an individual is in (or on the way to or from) the polling station, (s)he cannot 
perform another activity.   
 
 Downs’ (1957) original model was restricted to the “instrumental” benefits of voting.  
This restriction led to the “paradox of voting”.  One single vote has practically no 
influence on the election outcome (whenever the electorate reaches a certain size) such 
that the “instrumental” benefits are close to zero.  Given the existence of positive – though 
admittedly small – costs attached to this action, no individual would rationally vote for 
instrumental reasons.2  Still, in reality, significant turnout rates are observed even when 
voting is not compulsory (Geys, 2002).  To overcome this paradox, several solutions have 
been proposed (for a review, see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Geys, 2005a).  The most 
common is to include “expressive” or “consumption” benefits of voting (e.g. Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968).  These expressive benefits (D) entail the satisfaction from compliance 
with the ethics of voting (“civic duty”), from affirming allegiance to the political system 
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or a political party, from deciding who to vote for and going to the polls (“entertainment 
value”) and from the affirmation of one’s efficacy in the political system (Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968, 28). 
 
One final remark is necessary.  Expression (1) applies to all potential voters, irrespective of 
their favourite party.  This can be seen most clearly if we regard the simpler case where two 
parties compete under plurality rule.  Then, N=2 and the possible “winners” are parties 1 and 
2.  Using party 2 as the point of reference in the analysis, the above expression reduces to:  
 
R = – C + D > 0 ))(( 2111 UUpp
AV −−
 
Rewriting  as p and  as B, we get: )( 11
AV pp − )( 21 UU −
 
R = pB – C + D > 0 
 
This is the common formulation of the Calculus-of-Voting model by Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) where p is the probability that a voter is decisive in bringing about his favourite 
party’s victory.  For a voter favouring party 1 (2), the p-term as well as the B-term in the 
above expression will be positive (negative).  
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2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theory 
 
The general intuition behind the concept of fragmentation may be clear: it refers to the 
number of parties that participate in the election. Still, many authors have used – often 
implicitly – definitions that are broader.  This has sometimes led to confusion and ambiguous 
discussions of empirical results.  Two dimensions can be distinguished: the number of parties 
and the size inequalities between them.  Both these elements may have a (separate) effect on 
the voter’s Cost-Benefit analysis, and thereby on turnout.  In this section, we present 
theoretical arguments about the likely influence of the number of parties as well as their size 
inequalities.   
 
a) The number of parties 
 
There is no consensus in the vast literature on voter turnout whether – from a theoretical point 
of view – the number of parties in the election can be expected to increase or decrease 
turnout.  Each point of view is supported by several arguments. 
 
A positive effect can be expected on the basis of two arguments.  Firstly, a larger number of 
parties enriches the choice offered to the electorate.  This is likely to lower possible alienation 
feelings within the electorate by increasing the probability that voters can identify with some 
party (Seidle and Miller, 1976; Blais and Carty, 1990 and Hansen, 1994).  This closer 
identification can be expected to enlarge the “expressive” benefits (D) of voting to the 
individual (Schuessler, 2000).  Secondly, Dittrich and Johansen (1983) argue that the 
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existence of more parties increases the competitiveness of the party system and thus the 
potential “instrumental” benefits (B) from selecting “good policy”.  However, this argument 
may be flawed as one could expect that in a more competitive system the quality of any 
proposed policy will be higher.  Indeed, there is no guarantee that this general increase in the 
quality of policies proposed also increases the difference in utilities between policy platforms.  
And, following Downs (1957), the expected “instrumental” benefit of the voter depends on 
this difference rather than on the level of the preferred platform.  A positive effect on turnout 
may, however, still be expected if “higher quality politics in general” allows the voter to 
identify himself more easily with a political platform (creating “expressive” benefits to 
casting a ballot).   
 
A negative effect can be expected as an increase in the number of parties is likely to enlarge 
the need for coalition formation under given electoral rules (Jackman, 1987; Blais and Carty, 
1990 and De Winter et al., 1991).  As mentioned in section 1, this decreases the influence of 
the electorate in the choice of who governs it – formally it results in a lower or more uncertain 
value of p, the probability that an individual’s vote will be decisive - and thus is likely to 
decrease its willingness to vote.  Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) contend also that more parties 
might increase the complexity of the political system.  This not only makes it harder for the 
voter to make up his mind, but also increases his (information) costs (C) in general.  Facing 
higher costs reduces the voter’s likelihood of heading to the polls.  
 
b)  Size inequalities between the parties 
 
Size inequalities between the parties are an important element of political fragmentation and 
constitute a potentially relevant influence on voter turnout.  In fact, when discussing the 
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empirical literature later on, it will become clear that many authors analysing the effect of size 
fragmentation on turnout implicitly take this influence into account.  They do this via the use 
of concentration indices borrowed from industrial economics.  Such indices, for instance the 
“effective” number of parties (ENP, Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), regard the effect of the 
number of participants as well as their relative sizes.  Unfortunately, hitherto there is little 
formal theoretical argument given as to why size inequalities influence the level of voter 
turnout.  We bring two reasons to the reader’s attention: the expected closeness of the election 
and the incidence of dominant parties. 
 
First of all, size inequalities may be an important measure for the expected closeness of the 
election.  This closeness positively affects the probability for a single voter to be decisive (p) 
and thus affects turnout.   Actually, in two-party contests the expected equality – formally: the 
difference in expected vote shares between both candidates (or parties) – is the standard way 
to measure closeness.  The general intuition there is clear.  A marginal voter is more likely to 
be decisive if both parties have an expected vote share of 50 % than if the expectations are 
such that one party has, say, an 85 % expected vote share.  However, a generalisation of this 
argument to situations where more than two parties compete under plurality rule or to 
alternative electoral rules is not straightforward.  
 
Secondly, size inequalities between parties may be of relevance irrespective of the fact that 
they proxy closeness.  Where the coalition formation process is not exogenous, the second 
stage of government formation is a “black box” to the voters.  In such case, size inequalities 
may reflect power inequalities in the coalition negotiations and, importantly, in the 
government (cfr. Stigler, 1972).  Large size inequalities could refer to the presence of 
powerful political parties that dominate politics.  Obviously, this “dominance” could refer to 
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either of two separate elements.  Firstly, parties may become so big that they are expected to 
have a majority of the votes.  In that case, the individual voter plays no role and might as well 
stay home (the probability p of being decisive equals 0).  Hence, dominance in this sense 
leads to lower turnout.  Secondly, dominance may refer to playing a dominant role in coalition 
negotiations.  The presence of a large party in such negotiations reduces the number of 
possible coalitions that can be formed (given the formation of majority coalitions).  In fact, 
the number of majority coalitions that can be formed is at a maximum when the votes/seats 
are distributed perfectly equal and at a minimum when one party holds all the votes/seats.  
Increasing the level of inequality in the votes/seats distribution between these two extremes 
always leads to a non-increasing number of coalition possibilities. Hence, the formation 
process becomes “easier” (i.e. more transparent and predictable) when there is a large party 
and dominance can then be expected to increase turnout.  In other words, the size inequalities 
may make the second stage in the process of forming a political majority less of a black box.   
 
2.2 Empirical literature 
 
The vast majority of the empirical work on voter turnout can be categorized in one of two 
types: individual-level and aggregate-level analyses.  Whereas the former take the individual 
voter as the focus of the analysis, the latter regard turnout rates in municipalities, states or 
countries as the central element of analysis.  However, the effect of fragmentation on turnout 
has been most often studied using aggregate data.  The discussion of the empirical results of 
these analyses – with respect to fragmentation – is summarised in table 1.  The table is 
structured as follows.  Of each study (mentioned in column 1), we first give the exact 
definition of the fragmentation variable(s) used and the sample studied in columns 2 and 3 
respectively.  Column 4 presents whether or not fragmentation has a turnout-increasing effect 
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and the last column testifies of the statistical significance of the fragmentation effect.  Each 
“Yes” indicates statistical significance at least at the 95 percent confidence level. 
___________________ 
Table 1 about here  
___________________ 
 
The studies in table 1 have been subdivided into three groups. 
 
 Firstly, there are ten studies that use a fragmentation measure that only taps into the first 
dimension of fragmentation, the number of parties.  Seidle and Miller (1976) and Settle 
and Abrams (1976) do so by introducing a dummy variable.  They come to opposite 
conclusions.  Seidle and Miller (1976) find that the competition of three candidates for 
one seat significantly increases turnout compared to a two-candidate contest in a cross-
section of 144 UK counties (1964 and 1966).  Analysing a time-series of 26 US 
presidential elections Settle and Abrams (1976) find that a third candidate significantly 
reduces turnout.   
Six other studies in this category introduce the actual number of parties that contest the 
election as their measure of fragmentation (Crepaz, 1990; De Winter et al., 1991; 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1993; Hoffman-Martinot, 1994; Hansen, 1994 and Hoffman-
Martinot et al., 1996).3  Once again, the conclusions contradict each other.  Both studies 
on municipal elections in France find that a larger number of parties significantly reduces 
turnout (Hoffman-Martinot, 1994 and Hoffman-Martinot et al., 1996) while the opposite 
is true for municipal elections in Norway (Hansen, 1994).  A possible explanation lies in 
the difference in the electoral rules used in both countries.  France elects its municipal 
councillors via a two-ballot majority system, while Norway has a system of proportional 
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representation.  Whereas votes for smaller parties may easily be considered “wasted 
votes” in the French system, this is not so in the Norwegian system.  Individuals who 
want to vote for small parties thus have less reason to turn out in France than in Norway.4  
The same contradictive signs are found in cross-country studies.  A positive effect is 
found in the analysis of 19 countries of Crepaz (1990), while Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
(1993) find a negative effect in their analysis of 59 countries.  De Winter et al. (1991) 
show the effect of the number of parties to be non-linear when they regard all Belgian 
municipalities in the 1988 municipal elections.  Turnout marginally increases with the 
number of parties until four parties and sharply decreases afterwards.   
Finally, the last two studies in this category (Franklin and Hirczy, 1998 and Franklin, 
1999) employ the number of years of “divided” government in the US as their measure of 
political fragmentation.  Both papers find that turnout levels decrease significantly with 
the number of years of divided government. 
 
 A second group of five studies employs a fragmentation variable that considers both the 
number of parties and the size inequalities between them.  All five studies look at 
legislative parties rather than all parties that participated in the election.  Jackman (1987) 
and Pérez-Linàn (2001) consider the “effective” number of parties.  Jackman (1987) finds 
that turnout significantly decreases with the number of effective parties in the legislature 
of 19 industrial democracies.  Pérez-Linàn (2001) estimates the same model using data on 
17 Latin American countries.  She finds an (insignificant) positive effect of fragmentation.   
Jackman and Miller (1995) use the inverse of the ENP-index as well as a related index 
presented by Molinar (1991).  Both operationalizations provide a significant negative 
coefficient, indicating turnout to decline with the (“effective”) number of parties.   
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Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992) and Kirchgässner and Zu Himmern (1997) 
analyse turnout in elections for the German Bundestag where a hybrid electoral system is 
used, combining elements of both plurality and PR. They focus on the effect of (expected) 
closeness.  The latter is measured by the expected difference in votes between the two 
major candidates.  As an alternative, and to capture effects from three or four party 
contests, they use an “entropy” measure )ln(
1 i
n
i i
ppE ∑=−= .  This measure, in general, 
leads to more significant results.  To our opinion, and as discussed above, this can be 
interpreted as evidence for the existence of a number-of-parties effect over and above the 
closeness effect that the authors concentrate on (and which, in our terminology is a size-
inequalities effect).  Indeed, entropy, like the ENP or any other concentration index 
depends on both the size-inequalities between parties and the number of parties.5
 
 Finally, three studies explore both types of fragmentation variables; using the “actual” as 
well as the “effective” number of parties (Blais and Carty, 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska, 
1998 and Blais, 2000).  We must note, however, that the final regression equation in each 
study includes only the fragmentation variable that gave the best results (see table 1).  All 
three studies analyse data on more than 300 elections and find that turnout is significantly 
depressed at higher levels of political fragmentation.  Interestingly, Blais and Dobrzynska 
(1998) and Blais (2000) find that the number of parties best explains the observed 
variation in turnout, whereas Blais and Carty (1990) report a preferred regression result 
with the effective number of parties as the indicator of political fragmentation (thus 
referring to a separate effect from size inequalities). 
 
 
3.  Empirical analysis  
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 The system of PR that underlies municipal politics in Flanders leads to a highly fragmented 
political landscape in most jurisdictions. We analyse how this fragmentation affects turnout.  
Our analysis explains turnout in the 2000 municipal elections for 307 of the 308 Flemish 
municipalities (all except Herstappe).  It is important to note that Flemish municipalities have 
compulsory voting.  Still, this compulsory character is to a large extent ‘symbolic’ as 
penalisation is virtually non-existent in practice.  Figures about the level of prosecution for 
the municipal election year 2000 were obtained by surveying the 13 Flemish judicial areas.  
Non-voters were prosecuted in but 2 of these (Turnhout and Mechelen).  And even here, only 
about 1 percent of the non-voters was prosecuted (391 individuals on a total of 34,260 non-
voters in these areas).6   Not only is the number of people that do not adhere to this law large, 
there is also significant inter-municipal variation in the turnout rates.  It is this variation that 
we analyse in this paper.   
 
As an introduction to the empirical work, in section 3.1 we provide some summary statistics 
and background information on turnout and political fragmentation in the Flemish 
municipalities. Section 3.2 presents the empirical model.  Central attention is thereby given to 
the effect of political fragmentation.  Section 3.3 contains a discussion of the main results. 
 
 
3.1 Turnout and political fragmentation in the Flemish municipalities 
 
The central variable for our empirical work is the percentage turnout in the municipality, 
defined as the number of votes cast (valid as well as invalid) divided by the number of 
registered voters.  The variation in turnout rates among the 307 Flemish municipalities is 
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depicted in figure 1.  Turnout rates are given on the X-axis, while the number of 
municipalities with a given level of turnout is read from the Y-axis.  It can be seen that 
turnout is generally very high.  In fact, the average turnout rate during the 2000 elections in 
the 307 municipalities considered in the analysis was 94,11%.  Still, it is clear that there is a 
reasonable amount of variation between the turnout rates of the Flemish municipalities – even 
though voting is (theoretically) compulsory.  More precisely, turnout rates varied between 
98.46% in Mesen and 87.95% in Drogenbos and displayed a standard deviation of 2.00%. 
___________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
 ___________________ 
 
In table 2 we present some figures concerning political fragmentation levels in the 307 
Flemish municipalities.  It can be seen that in the average municipality about 5 political 
parties competed in the election.  Although some of the lists that are presented to the voter are 
actually cartels of a number of parties or political groups, we refer to these lists as being a 
‘party’ because they present one common alternative to the voter. There is also significant 
variation.  That fragmentation at the election level also leads to fragmented parliaments (and 
governments) is clear from the fact that the average Flemish municipality has about 4 parties 
in the council and just under two parties forming a coalition.  More detailed figures (not in the 
table) reveal that 96 municipalities had a single-party majority while 49 had a coalition of 
three or more parties. 
___________________ 
Table 2 about here  
___________________ 
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3.2 Empirical model 
 
Our empirical model relates electoral turnout to indicators of political fragmentation while 
controlling for other “typical” determinants of voting behaviour.   These controls where 
derived from a thorough reading of the relevant literature (Geys, 2005b) and lead us to 
estimate the following model using data on the municipal elections of 2000 for 307 Flemish 
municipalities: 
 
Ti  = γ + β1 Xi + β2 FRAGi + εi (1) 
 
where i (= 1 to 307) is an index for municipality i and where Ti is a logistic transformation of 
turnout (Ti = ln (Turnouti/(1-Turnouti)).  Such a transformation is necessary as the range of 
turnout is limited to the 0 to 100 percent interval.  If we would simply use a linear estimation 
method, the estimated turnout numbers are not constrained to lie within this interval.  After 
transformation, the dependent variable ranges from negative infinity to positive infinity, 
eliminating predictions outside the allowable range (Thomas, 1997). 
 
The Xi-vector is composed of the following eight control variables: number of registered 
voters (REG); population density (per m²; DENS); (out- and inward) migration as % of 
population (MIGR); population over 65 as % of population (AGE); unemployed as % of 
population (UNEM); per capita taxable income (in 1000 Euro; Y); income inequality (ratio of 
interquartile difference in income to the median value; INCDIV) and, finally, a dummy that 
equals 1 for municipalities in those judicial areas where non-voters are prosecuted (0 for all 
other municipalities; PROSEC).  As mentioned before, there are only two judicial areas that 
prosecuted non-voters after the 2000 municipal elections: Turnhout and Mechelen.  They 
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cover 40 of the 307 municipalities in our population.7, 8  Note that the obligation to vote 
implies that costs may also be incurred if one decides not to turn out (these costs could be 
either legal fines or social sanctions).    So, technically speaking, these ‘avoided costs of non-
voting’ can be seen as benefits from voting.   
These explanatory variables are determinants of p, B, C or D (cfr. section 1).  It should be 
clear, however, that classifying determinants may not always be unambiguous as some may 
affect more than a single variable in the theoretical model.  We return to this issue while 
discussing our empirical results. 
 
Finally, FRAG measures the effect of political fragmentation on voter turnout.  This is where 
our model diverges significantly from the previous literature.  Indeed, a vast majority of the 
studies to date have either used the “actual” or the “effective” number of parties to measure 
political fragmentation.  However, when regarding the actual number of parties, one 
implicitly assumes that the size inequalities between the parties do not matter.  To the extent 
that they do matter, this leads to misspecification and biased estimation results.  If, on the 
other hand, one uses the “effective” number of parties, one imposes that both elements of 
fragmentation affect turnout.  When this (implicit) assumption is not met by the data, this 
leads to a reduction in the efficiency of the model’s parameter estimates.  More importantly, 
combining the number of parties and size inequalities in one index precludes the analysis of 
both elements’ separate effects on voter turnout.9   
 
Both these issues can be resolved by separating the “effective” number of parties into two 
distinct measures for the number of parties and size inequalities respectively.  This idea is 
taken from Davies (1979) who argued – in the context of industry concentration – that such a 
separation is possible for any concentration index.  Specifically, following Davies (1980), 
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Davies et al. (1988) and Chakravarty (1995), the “effective” number of parties can be written 
as: 
 ENP = 
cv² 1
NoP
+    with cv = s
ss
NoP
NoP
i
i∑
=
−
1
)²(1
 
 
where si represents the share of votes for party i in the election, s  is the average vote share 
over all parties and NoP equals the number of parties in the election.  The coefficient of 
variation (cv) is a well-known and “popular index of inequality” (Chakravarty, 1995, 20).  
Importantly, by including NoP as well as I (=1+cv²) in the empirical analysis, it is possible to 
assess the size, significance and direction of the effects of both elements of fragmentation 
separately.   
 
 3.3 Empirical results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our estimation.  Prior to discussing our findings with respect to 
the independent variables, we first draw attention to the functional form of the specification.  
Columns (1) and (2) in table 3 present the results of a linear model.10  Columns (3) and (4) 
show the findings of a loglinear specification (where we take the natural logarithm of all 
explanatory variables).  We perform Ramsey’s (1969) Regression Equation Specification 
Error Test (RESET).  This test involves adding powers of the fitted values of the original 
model into the equation (squared for RESET² and squared and cubed for RESET³) and F-
testing the statistical significance of these “variables”.  If there is no misspecification (of the 
functional form), these should not have any explanatory value.  The results – presented at the 
bottom of table 3 – indicate that the test statistics for RESET² as well as RESET³ are 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level in a linear specification, but not in a loglinear 
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specification.  As a consequence, further interpretations will centre on the loglinear 
specification.   
___________________ 
Table 3 about here  
___________________ 
 
Table 3 shows that the overall fit of the model is very good.  Almost 60% of the variation in 
turnout between the Flemish municipalities can be explained by the variables in our model.  
The number of parties negatively affects electoral turnout.  Hence, the possible positive 
effects associated with multi-party systems (through lower alienation and a more competitive 
political system) seem to be dominated by the negative effects (higher need for coalition 
formation and higher informational costs).  De Winter et al. (1991) observed a similar 
negative effect in the 1988 municipal elections in Flanders (and in Belgium as a whole). 
 
The coefficient for size-inequalities in table 3 shows that electoral turnout is higher the more 
unequal in size are the political parties.  A possible explanation for this positive sign is that 
the presence of parties that dominate the political landscape increase the representative 
voter’s incentives to turn out.  We have already indicated at the outset of the present paper 
that this is most likely due to the increased transparency and predictability of the coalition 
formation process.  This may strengthen the (perceived) link between the individual voter’s 
vote and the political outcome of the elections – thus leading to an increased voter turnout.  
However, the parameter estimate for the effect of size inequalities only approaches statistical 
significance at the 10% level (p = 0.13).  Hence, the additional effect of size inequalities is 
statistically rather weak.11
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Having discussed the fragmentation variables, we now turn to a discussion of the other 
variables included in the model.   As mentioned earlier, these variables are determinants of p, 
B, C and/or D (section 1), though it is clear that their classification under only one of these 
headings is not always unambiguous (see below).  From table 3 we see that all but two of the 
control variables included in the model have a significant effect on electoral turnout in 
Flanders.  First, the number of registered voters (REG) significantly reduces turnout.  This is 
in line with the Downsian argument that a larger voting population decreases the probability 
(p) that one vote will make a difference (Downs, 1957).  Secondly, higher migration levels 
(MIGR) depress turnout.  This may suggest that municipalities with a highly stable population 
have a tighter social network and community life with higher “social pressure” (Karnig and 
Walter, 1974 and Hoffman-Martinot, 1994).  Also, Hoffman-Martinot (1994) argues that 
stable, self-centred communities might grow stronger feelings of identification, also 
increasing social pressure to turn out the vote.  Both elements increase the value of the D-
term.  An alternative explanation for the negative migration-effect may be that voters who 
have resided in the same community for a longer period are more aware of local issues and 
candidates (Filer et al., 1993).  This implies that they face lower information costs (C).  
Finally, higher (out)-migration may indicate that people do not vote as, actually, they might 
live elsewhere in the near future and will thus be unaffected by local policy (B). 
 
Population density (DENS) is negatively correlated with turnout.   This may indicate that 
residents of more densely populated areas are less well integrated in the community as 
urbanisation leads to “a weakening of interpersonal bonds” (Hoffman-Martinot, 1994, 14; see 
also Wirth, 1938).  As a consequence, the social pressure to vote will be weaker, depressing 
the D-term and thereby turnout.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for the municipalities 
in judicial areas where non-voters were prosecuted (PROSEC) – relating to the costs (C) that 
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people may avoid by voting – shows a significant negative sign.  This is somewhat 
counterintuitive: it indicates that the municipalities in jurisdictions where non-voting is in 
practice penalised are actually confronted with lower turnout.  Two explanations are possible: 
the higher prosecution level reflects the response to a “structural” lower turnout level or 
higher prosecution levels crowd-out the intrinsic motivation of the Flemish voter to 
participate in the electoral process (Frey, 1997).12  The latter argument refers to the possibility 
that feelings of civic duty (D) among the population are diluted by a government that – by 
prosecuting – reveals a lack of trust in its citizens.  
 
While a larger proportion of elderly in the population (AGE) also tends to depress turnout at 
the polls, unemployment (UNEM) and average income (Y) do not reach generally accepted 
levels of significance.13  Finally, income diversity (INCDIV) has a significantly negative 
effect on turnout. As a measure for the socio-economic heterogeneity of the population, 
income diversity may weaken social pressure within the community to turn out to vote.  It has 
been argued that “planners who are concerned with building communities (...) have accepted 
the fact that social homogeneity is a necessary prerequisite of community cohesion”  (Cohen, 
1982, 259).  More cohesion can be expected to increase group solidarity (Ashworth et al., 
2002) and thus social pressure towards electoral turnout (D). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Using data on the 2000 municipal elections in Flanders we show that the number of parties in 
the election has a negative impact on turnout.  Possible positive effects of multi-party systems 
on turnout (through lower alienation and a more competitive political system) are dominated 
by negative effects (higher need for coalition formation and higher informational costs).  This 
contradicts the results in Hansen (1994) where a positive effect of the number of parties on 
turnout was found in a context with proportional representation.  A possible explanation for 
this remarkable difference may be the fact that Flemish municipalities – unlike their 
Norwegian counterparts – have a parliamentary system.  In Norwegian municipalities 
executive boards are established in which all parties have members according to their share of 
seats in the council (Tovmo, 2001).  Our result may be taken to suggest that in Flemish 
municipalities the increased probability for coalition formation in municipalities with more 
parties actually discourages the electorate because its direct influence in choosing their 
government decreases.  The estimated effect from the size inequalities between the parties is 
positive.  Turnout thus appears to be higher the more unequal in size are the political parties.  
However, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.  The 
size inequalities between the parties thus do not significantly add to the explanatory power of 
the model (once the number of parties is taken into account). 
 
These results support the finding in the literature that political fragmentation is an important 
determinant of electoral turnout.  The central contribution of the present paper, however, was 
to present a method that allows disentangling the effects of two dimensions of fragmentation: 
the number of parties that participate in the election and the size inequalities between those 
parties.  Thus far, in the literature either one of these dimensions was ignored (looking only at 
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the number of parties) or they were lumped into one index.  Separation of the effects of both 
fragmentation dimensions is important for both statistical and empirical reasons.  From a 
statistical point of view, it is important to avoid misspecification or lack of efficiency of the 
model.  From an empirical point of view, only by disentangling the effects it is possible to 
assess the impact of both the number of parties and the size inequalities.  For both these 
impacts several theoretical arguments have been presented.   Disentangling the fragmentation 
index is indispensable to test these. 
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Table 1: Turnout studies incorporating political fragmentation 
 
Study Measure Sample Sign Significance 
One dimension 
Seidle and Miller 
(1976) 
Dummy equal to 1 in 2-
candidate contest and 0 in 3-
candidate contest 
U.K. county 
seats in general 
elections 
Increase Yes 
Settle and Abrams 
(1976) 
Dummy equal to 0 in 2-
candidate contest and 1 in 3-
candidate contest 
U.S. presidential Decrease Yes 
Crepaz (1990) NoP in legislature a 16 countries Increase No 
De Winter et al. 
(1991) 
Number of party lists in 
election 
Belgian 
municipalities 
Non-
linear b
Yes 
Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (1993) 
Number of “major” parties in 
election 
59 countries Decrease No 
Hoffman-Martinot 
(1994) 
NoP in election French 
municipalities 
Decrease Yes  
Hansen (1994) NoP in election Norwegian 
municipalities 
Increase Yes 
Hoffman-Martinot 
et al. (1996) 
NoP in election French 
municipalities 
Decrease Yes 
Franklin and 
Hirczy (1998) 
Number of years of 
“divided” government 
39 presidential 
elections (US) 
Decrease Yes 
Franklin (1999) Number of years of 
“divided” government 
39 presidential 
elections (US) 
Decrease Yes 
Both dimensions 
Jackman (1987) ENP in legislature 19 countries Decrease Yes 
Kirchgässner and 
Schimmelpfennig 
(1992) 
Entropy measure German and UK 
General 
Elections 
Increase Yes 
Jackman and 
Miller (1995) 
ENP in legislature 
Molinar-index 
22 democratic 
countries 
Decrease 
Decrease 
Yes 
No c
Kirchgässner and 
Zu Himmern 
(1997) 
Entropy measure  German 
Bundestag  
Increase Yes 
Pérez-Linàn (2001) ENP in legislature 17 countries Increase No 
Several indices d
Blais and Carty 
(1990) 
ENP in legislature 
ENP in election 
NoP in election 
NoP in legislature 
20 countries 
 
Decrease 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- 
- 
- 
Blais and 
Dobrzynska (1998) 
NoP in election 
ENP in legislature 
ENP in election 
91 democratic 
countries 
Decrease 
- 
- 
Yes 
- 
- 
Blais (2000) NoP in election 
ENP in legislature 
ENP in election 
91 democratic 
countries 
  
Decrease 
- 
- 
Yes 
- 
- 
Notes: a NoP stand for the actual number of parties, ENP stands for the “effective” number of parties. 
b The number of lists has a slight positive effect up to 4 lists and affects turnout negatively afterwards. 
c The variable is significant at the 10%-level. 
d All measures were tried, but only one was reported.   
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Table 2 : Descriptive statistics on Fragmentation  
(307 Flemish municipalities) 
 
Number of parties in  2000 
 Average Variance 
Election 5.17 3.01 
Council 4.29 1.82 
Coalition 1.87 0.52 
Source: Own calculations  
 
 28
  
Table 3: The optimal “index” of fragmentation 
 
Variable 
 
Linear 
(1) 
Linear 
(2) 
 Log-linear 
(3) 
Log-linear 
(4) 
Intercept 4.892 *** 
(22.52) 
4.877 *** 
(28.48) 
8.275 *** 
(9.71) 
7.804 *** 
(10.65) 
REG 
 
-0.000 
(-1.12) 
- -0.154 *** 
(-5.14) 
-0.151 *** 
(-5.28) 
DENS -0.0002 *** 
(-4.06) 
-0.0002 *** 
(-4.54) 
-0.136 *** 
(-4.86) 
-0.130 *** 
(-5.11) 
MIGR -2.701 *** 
(-3.02) 
-2.586 *** 
(-3.10) 
-0.357 *** 
(-4.68) 
-0.364 *** 
(-5.13) 
AGE -2.010 *** 
(-3.69) 
-2.067 *** 
(-3.87) 
-0.271 *** 
(-3.42) 
-0.260 *** 
(-3.35) 
Y -0.033 * 
(-1.90) 
-0.032 * 
(-1.86) 
0.157 
(0.79) 
- 
INCDIV -0.007 *** 
(-2.80) 
0.007 *** 
(-2.97) 
-1.052 *** 
(-4.47) 
-0.860 *** 
(-6.08) 
UNEM -0.434 
(-0.27) 
- -0.027 
(-0.55) 
- 
PROSEC -0.112 ** 
(-2.57) 
-0.111 *** 
(-2.58) 
-0.111 *** 
(-2.66) 
-0.111 *** 
(-2.72) 
NoP -0.074 *** 
(-5.96) 
-0.076 *** 
(-7.79) 
-0.203 *** 
(-3.61) 
-0.162 *** 
(-3.20) 
I -0.045 
(0.58) 
- 0.128 
(1.52) 
- 
 
adj R² 
RESET² 
RESET³ 
 
55.21 
6.24 ** 
9.50 *** 
 
55.25 
2.87 * 
6.48 *** 
 
59.44 
0.60 
1.90 
 
59.44 
0.13 
1.37 
 
N = 307 for each regression; t-statistics between brackets 
*** Significant at 1 % level; ** at 5 % level; * at 10% level 
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Figure 1: Distribution of municipal turnout rates for 307 Flemish municipalities 
Source: Own calculations 
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Notes: 
 
1  Given the disproportionality of most electoral systems, this need not be a majority of the votes. 
2  Stigler (1972, 102-104) and Filer (1977, 14-15), however, argue that the probability of casting a vote that 
determines the “winner” in the election is not the only relevant one.  Voters may also turn out to increase the 
vote percentage for their party as higher support turns a political party more influential (even as opposition 
party).  Still, they agree that the effect of any single vote(r) remains marginal in most situations such that 
“this restatement does not in turn magically dispose of the paradox” (Stigler, 1972, 104).   
3 Crepaz (1990) uses the number of parties in the legislation and Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1993) use the 
number of “major” political parties in the election. 
4  The reason why potential supporters of smaller parties may feel they waste their vote in non-proportional 
systems (a “psychological effect”) is that small parties face a much higher hurdle to obtain representation in 
such systems (a “mechanical effect”) (see Duverger, 1972).  This higher threshold is likely to discourage 
voters of the smaller parties in the election. 
5  We find it hard, however, to grasp the intuition of a closeness definition that considers a three-party-contest 
with expected votes (0.48; 0.48; 0.04) much closer than a two-party contest with (0.50; 0.50) expected votes 
(as indeed the entropy measure takes the value 0.83 and 0.69 respectively). 
6  Vanmaercke (1993, 66) reports even lower prosecution levels for the 1985 parliamentary elections.  He 
shows that after these elections only 62 out of over 400,000 non-voters were fined in Belgium as a whole. 
7  Using data on prosecution after the 2000 municipal election to explain turnout in that same election is not 
ideal.  It (implicitly) assumes that the electorate can perfectly foresee whether or not prosecution will take 
place.  Casual observation of the limited data that are available on prosecution of non-voters in earlier 
elections, however, show prosecution only in the same two judicial areas after the 1994 municipal elections. 
8  Data on prosecution in the judicial area of Dendermonde are missing.  We assume that this implies that no 
prosecution took place in the 32 municipalities in this area.  Re-estimating our model dropping these 
municipalities has no significant effect on the estimated coefficients (results available upon request). 
9  Using the “effective” number of parties (ENP) furthermore introduces a restriction into the model as one 
assumes a very specific relation between the number of parties and size inequalities.  ENP corresponds to the 
inverse of the Herfindahl index.  The latter gives the sum of squared vote shares over all parties.  Still, there 
is no theoretical argument as to why the shares should be squared.  The latter corresponds to using the more 
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general Hannah and Kay (1977) concentration index, ∑ = −ni iVote1 ))1/(1()( αα , and setting α equal to 2.  Testing 
this restriction shows that there is no significant difference between the results using the optimal (adjusted R² 
maximizing) α (equal to 0.9) and α = 2.  Hence, we follow the main strand of the literature in focusing on the 
“effective” number of parties. 
10  It should be observed that the linear specification does not take into account the non-linear decomposition of 
ENP discussed in section 3.2.  We do, however, present the linear specification as a point of reference. 
11  Including log NoP and log (1 + cv²) is only perfectly equivalent to including log (ENP) if we restrict the sum 
of the coefficients of both these variables to be equal to that of log (ENP).  The results presented in Columns 
(3) and (4) of table 3 are obtained without imposing this restriction (creating a more general model to the one 
in which the restriction is imposed).  Still, an F-test shows that we cannot reject that the restriction holds (F1, 
296 = 2.02; p > 0.1).  Moreover, imposing the restriction does not change the main tenor of the results 
(available upon request). 
12  A simultaneous estimation technique and/or a panel analysis that takes into account variation of turnout over 
time is needed to discriminate between the different explanations.  Unfortunately, data on prosecution of 
non-voting are not available for longer time periods.   
13  In interpreting the parameter estimates of these three variables, one should be aware of the so-called 
“ecological fallacy”.  This refers to the bias that may occur because an association observed between 
variables at an aggregate level does not necessarily represent an association that exists at an individual level 
(see e.g. Robinson, 1950; Kramer, 1983). 
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